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j'fAH 
HENRY K. CHAI II 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent SCM Land Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE SUPREME 
OF THE STATE OF 
SCM LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
WATKINS & FABER, and WALTER Case No. 19172 
P. FABER, JR., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), plaintiff and respondent SCM 
Land Company submits a Supplemental Point Based Upon New 
Authority. Respondent requests the Clerk to substitute the 
new page 12 and add the supplemental point beginning at 
page 21. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
BRIEF 
fttfZ. 
n 
I 
OCT 2 81983 
0»\ Sbjsaw Coo*. We* 
COURT 
UTAH 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
POINT BASED UPON NEW AUTHORITY 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Keri Warr being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for SCM Land Company
 a n d t h a t s h e 
mailed £ copy of Notice of Supplemental Point Based Upon New 
Authority ana supplemental Fomt tsased upon 
upon the following parties:
 N e w Authority 
W. Chris Wicker 
Brian W. Burnett 
Watkins & Faber 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
mailing the same, postage prepaid on the 28th day of October 
, 1983 . 
~twu.Ua/ { sxj^ 
K e n Warr 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of October 
, 1983 . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT BASED 
UPON NEW AUTHORITY 
IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT AS PAROL EVIDENCE 
FISCHER'S ALLEGED ORAL PROMISE WHICH 
CONTRADICTED AND REPUDIATED THE WRITTEN 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
Over SCM Landfs objection, the trial court admitted as parol 
evidence testimony of the alleged oral promise. Watkins & Faber 
argued, and the trial court agreed, that FMA Financial Corporation 
allowed this testimony even though it not only contradicted the 
plain language of the Lease Agreement, but also repudiated the 
obligation represented by the Lease Agreement. This Court 
recently rejected this construction of FMA Financial Corporation. 
In Bushell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, Case No. 18284 
(Utah October 24, 1983), the sellers executed a promisory note 
for the balance of the real estate commission. After closing, 
the buyer defaulted. The sellers refused to pay the promissory 
note claiming an unwritten agreement that they need not pay if 
the buyer defaulted. In affirming summary judgment against the 
sellers, this Court ruled that FMA Financial Corporation does not 
allow admission of the alleged oral agreement as parol evidence: 
First, the [sellers1] assertion that payment 
on the promissory note was conditioned on 
payments made by the buyer is the assertion 
of an agreement that not only contradicts 
the plain language found in all of the 
closing documents, but also directly re-
pudiates the obligation represented in the 
promissory note. Thus, admission of proof of 
such an agreement would be contrary to the 
rule as stated [in FMA Financial Corporation.] 
(p5) 
The alleged oral promise relied upon by Watkins & Faber 
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contradicts and repudiates the written Lease Agreement. As 
such it was error to admit it. SCM Land's motions for 
Summary Judgment and a directed verdict should have been granted, 
DATED this d: day of CkJdUts^ 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By & M ^ 
Henry K. Chai 
At torneys for/SCM Larfd 
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failed to satisfy the recording statute, Watkins 6 Faber's 
argument fails. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION DEFENSE SINCE A 
PROMISE TO AGREE IN THE FUTURE IS NUGATORY 
AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE CONSIDERATION FOR 
AN OTHERWISE ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
Watkins & Faber does not argue that the written lease 
agreement for Suite 606 is not binding on them. Rather they 
contend that under the parol evidence rule Fischer's promise 
to make a future agreement was an unwritten term of the writ-
ten lease agreement, that this term represented part of the 
consideration for the written lease, and that this considera-
tion failed. The trial court ruled that unless this oral 
term to agree in the future was an enforceable contract, the 
oral term was nugatory. Being nugatory, it cannot be consid-
eration and therefore cannot fail. 
The correctness of the trial court's ruling is elementary 
contract law. 
[UJnless an agreement to make a future contract is 
definite and certain upon all the subjects to be 
embraced, it is nugatory. To be enforceable, a con-
tract to enter into a future contract must specify 
all its material and essential terms and leave none 
to be agreed upon as the result of future negotia-
tions. . • . If any essential term is left open for 
future consideration, there is no binding contract, 
and an agreement to reach an agreement imposes no 
obligation on the parties thereto. 
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17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 26. This principle is so elementary 
that this court saw no need to "multiply authority" on the 
proposition and simply stated: 
Where the parties have left an essential part of the 
agreement for future determination, it is no doubt 
correct to say that the contract is not complete. 
Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 P.133, 
135 (1926). 
Consistent with this law, the trial court submitted a 
special interrogatory to the jury on whether there was an 
oral contract to enter into a written lease agreement. The 
jury was properly instructed on mutual assent and essential 
terms. (Jury Instruction No. 17) After considering Watkins 
6 Faberfs evidence, against which SCM Land offered no evi-
dence, the jury concluded there was no oral contract. Thus 
the oral promise to make a future agreement was nugatory and 
not consideration. 
Watkins & Faber suggests that FMA Financial Corporation 
and Nielsen mandate an opposite result. As already dis-
cussed, these are parol evidence cases. They do not address 
the issue of promises to agree in the future as consideration. 
Watkins & Faber also argues that even if not specifically 
enforceable, the promise to agree in the future can still be 
the basis for rescission. This argument must fail. Hair-
splitting between enforceability and excuse is a distinction 
1 See supplemental point based upon new authority- See page 21 
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LOGAN TELEPHONE 
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 9 3 8 0 
GARDEN CITY. UTAH 
(601)946-3332 
Utah Supreme Court 
ATTN: Clerk 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
RE: Agathangelides et al v. Shaw et al 
Civil No. 18890, Supreme Court No. 19113 
Dear Clerk: 
In reviewing our Respondents1 Brief on Appeal filed on 
or about the 4th day of October, 1983, we discovered two 
typographical errors in the cases cited as authority. 
The first case is First State Bank v. Clock, 570 P2d 
720 (UT 1982) listed on the Table ot Authority and page 10. 
It should be corrected to First State Bank v. Clark. 
The second case is Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Credit 
Association, 623 P2d 714, (UT 1982) listed on the Table ot 
Authority and on page 20. It should be corrected to 642 P2d 
714, (UT 1982). 
Rule 75(p) (3) states that corrections can be made 
l!directly in ink on the copies lodged in the office of the 
Clerk.11 Would you please make the above listed corrections 
to your copies. 
Should you have any questions, please contact me. 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
Sincerely, /) C// 
Raymond N. Malouf 
RNM/dm 
mSB COUKf 
'.•/£EF 
| I T A H MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Ulr\sl
 15Q EAST 2 0 Q N O R T H S U I T E D 
DOCUMENI LOGAN. UTAH 84321 
*FM
 1F April 26, 1984 
CARL E- MALOUF f > 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF \ Ci \ \ L 
iJA 
DOurms NU. 
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